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PRESIDENTIAL FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY
FOLLOWING THE BUDGET ACT OF 1974
Louis Fisher*
In response to the claim by President Nixon that he possessed independent
authority to refuse to spend appropriated funds, Congress passed the Budget Act of
1974 to limit impoundment actions and revise the legislative budget process. The
objective was to strengthen congressional power over the President, but in practice
the new system held a potential for increased executive power. Precisely that took
place during the administration of Ronald Reagan. The result: a loss of budget
control and a tripling of the national debt during his two terms in office. Overall,
the new budget process has substantially reduced the President’s accountability in
providing needed leadership over budget aggregates, particularly the deficit.

I. INTRODUCTION
Presidents have always exercised some discretion over the spending of
appropriated funds. If they can carry out a program for fewer dollars than
Congress provided, no one would object. As Attorney General Harmon noted in
1896, an appropriation is not mandatory “to the extent that you are bound to
expend the full amount if the work can be done for less . . . .”1 These decisions
were routine managerial functions, in no sense representing a threat to legislative
prerogatives or constitutional government. Federal courts recognized that “the
head of an executive department of the government, in the administration of the
various and important concerns of his office, is continually required to exercise
judgment and discretion.”2
Matters changed dramatically with the Nixon administration. Beginning in
1971, President Richard Nixon claimed inherent constitutional authority to refuse
to spend federal funds, even to the extent of cutting programs in half, or eliminating
them entirely. This challenge to the legislative branch prompted Congress to hold
hearings to analyze executive authority to impound appropriated funds.3
During those hearings, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. denied that the President had
any authority:
under the Constitution to decide which laws will be executed or to what extent
they will be enforced. Yet, by using the impoundment technique, the President is
able to do just that. He is able to effect policy by determining which of the laws
* Visiting Professor, William and Mary Law School. From 1970 to 2010, Fisher worked at the
Library of Congress as Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers with Congressional Research Service
and Specialist in Constitutional Law at the Law Library. During that time he worked closely with
lawmakers on a variety of budget issues, including the Budget Act of 1974, the Gramm-Rudman Law,
biennial budgeting, the balanced budget amendment, the item veto, and covert funding. Many of his
articles and congressional testimony are posted on his webpage, http://loufisher.org.
1. Appropriation-Contracts, 21 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 414, 415 (1896); similar statements appear at
Statutory Construction-Secretary of War, 21 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 391, 392 (1896) and Statutory
Construction, 21 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 420, 422 (1896).
2. Brashear v. Mason, 47 U.S. 92, 102 (1848).
3. See generally Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1971).

2015]

PRESIDENTIAL FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

287

4

passed by Congress he will enforce and to what extent.

Senator Edmund S. Muskie participated actively on this issue through his
service on the Committee on Government Operations, chaired by Senator Ervin,
and its Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Impoundment of Funds, chaired by Senator
Lawton Chiles. During a hearing in 1973, Muskie referred to a legal analysis
prepared by William Rehnquist when he served as Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Office of Legal Counsel. Rehnquist acknowledged that the spending
of money “is inherently an executive function, but the execution of any law is, by
definition, an executive function.” It seemed to him “an anomalous proposition”
that because “the executive branch is bound to execute the laws, it is free to decline
to execute them.”5 Turning specifically to the administration’s announcement that
it cut federal funds for the construction of municipal water treatment facilities from
$11 billion to $5 billion in the current fiscal year and the next, Muskie objected that
this decision “was not an impoundment of appropriations” but instead “a direct and
flagrant violation of the authorization powers of Congress.”6
Observations in this article are drawn from personal experience with the
federal budget process. I joined the Library of Congress in September 1970.
Because of a law review article I published the previous year, analyzing
constitutional issues over impoundment,7 I worked closely with lawmakers and
committees to curb presidential power to withhold appropriated funds. During
committee hearings I sat behind Senator Ervin to provide professional assistance. I
participated in committee markup to evaluate amendments to the impoundment
bill, wrote the part of the conference report dealing with impoundment, and
received a signing pen and letter from President Richard Nixon.8 On other budget
matters, including the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit control statute, biennial
budgeting, the balanced budget amendment, and the item veto, I testified at
hearings and guided legislative efforts. Throughout that period I fully supported
the decision to limit impoundment and protect legislative powers.
However, I had grave doubts about the decision of Congress to centralize its
operations by passing budget resolutions. I thought it would greatly weaken the
President’s duty to take responsibility for budget estimates, particularly the size of
the national debt. I also considered the decentralized procedure in Congress to
have had benefits by making it more difficult for a President to gain control and
impose executive budget priorities. Precisely that happened in the first year of the
Reagan administration, leading to a tripling of the national deficit and a series of
feckless statutory efforts to control those deficits.

4. Id. at 2-3.
5. Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President: Joint Hearings on S. 373 Before the Ad
Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment of funds of the Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm.
on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 149 (1973).
6. Id. at 150.
7. Louis Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue, 38 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 124 (1969).
8. The impoundment battle in the early 1970s is covered in LOUIS FISHER, DEFENDING CONGRESS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 205-11 (2011).
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II. PRESIDENT NIXON CONFRONTS CONGRESS
From the 1930s through the 1960s, there were periodic disputes about
Presidents who refused to spend appropriated funds. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt withheld funds from some public works projects, President Harry
Truman impounded funds for the Air Force and canceled a supercarrier, and
impoundments continued during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
administrations.9 In those conflicts, Congress raised objections, agencies made
adjustments, and the regular political process prevented disputes from ripening into
a constitutional crisis. That spirit of accommodation and compromise disappeared
in the Nixon years, forcing Congress and the courts to curb presidential abuses.
In 1972, in the midst of his reelection campaign, President Nixon blamed
Congress for the level of federal deficits. A series of announcements from the
administration attempted to portray Congress as profligate and irresponsible in
money matters. Nixon’s message of July 26, calling for a spending ceiling,
claimed that the budget crisis resulted from the “hoary and traditional procedure of
the Congress, which now permits action on the various spending programs as if
they were unrelated and independent actions.”10 Because of its decentralized
actions, he claimed, Congress “arrives at total Federal spending in an accidental,
haphazard manner.”11 In a nationwide radio address on October 7, he warned that
“excessive spending by the Congress might cause a Congressional tax increase in
1973.”12
Other members of the administration joined in the attack. John Ehrlichman,
the President’s domestic adviser, castigated the “credit-card Congress” for adding
billions to the budget. He likened lawmakers to a spendthrift brother-in-law “who
has gotten hold of the family credit card and is running up big bills” with no
thought of paying them.13 It was a bold move, calculated to put Congress on the
defensive. If senators and representatives agreed to the goal of fiscal restraint and
acknowledged the need for legislative reform, Nixon could use that as justification
for impounding funds. Many lawmakers even outdid the administration in
decrying the irresponsibility of Congress.
Yet the facts did not support a simplistic picture of a virtuous President and
degenerate Congress. The decentralized system of Congress did not deprive
lawmakers of information about their fiscal decisions; they were regularly informed
of the larger picture by their Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal
Expenditures. “Scorekeeping reports,” printed in the Congressional Record from
month to month, told members of Congress how congressional actions compared to
the President’s budget. The results revealed a systematic and responsible pattern,
not chaos. Congressional totals generally remained within the President’s budget
aggregates.

9. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 161-67 (1975).
10. Special Message to the Congress on Federal Government Spending, 238 PUB. PAPERS 742 (July
26, 1972).
11. Id.
12. Radio Address on Federal Spending, 341 PUB. PAPERS 964 (Oct. 7, 1972).
13. Wall Street Journal staff, Nixon Message Warns Congress Democrats Against Voting
“Excessive” Money Bills, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1972, at 3.
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During a news conference on January 31, 1973, President Nixon asserted that
the “constitutional right for the President of the United States to impound funds—
and that is not to spend money, when the spending of money would mean either
increasing prices or increasing taxes for all the people—that right is absolutely
clear.”14 He vowed not to spend money “if the Congress overspends.”15 But Nixon
was not using impoundment merely to combat inflation and avoid public debt. In
announcing plans to cut research health grants, Model Cities funds, grants for urban
renewal, and funds for the clean-water program, he sponsored such costly projects
as the supersonic transport, a manned landing on Mars, general revenue sharing, a
larger Merchant Marine fleet, and the Safeguard Anti-ballistic (ABM) system.16
Impoundment was thus a means of shifting spending from congressional priorities
to executive priorities.
The premise of legislative irresponsibility led to the creation of a Joint Study
Committee on Budget Control.17 In its final report on April 18, 1973, the joint
committee essentially agreed with Nixon that increases in the size of budget
deficits resulted from procedural deficiencies within Congress: “The constant
continuation of deficits plus their increasing size illustrates the need for Congress
to obtain better control over the budget.”18 The committee concluded that the
decentralized nature of Congress was a significant factor in losing control over
deficits: “[T]he failure to arrive at congressional budget decisions on an overall
basis has been a contributory factor in this picture.”19 No committee, it said, was
responsible for deciding whether total outlays were appropriate for fiscal policy.20
Each spending bill “tends to be considered by Congress as a separate entity, and
any assessment of relative priorities among spending programs for the most part is
made solely within the context of the bill before Congress.”21
Statistics in the committee report did not support the claim of legislative
irresponsibility. In pointing out that the federal budget had been in a deficit
position thirty-seven times since 1920, the report acknowledged that in thirty-two
of those years Presidents submitted budgets to Congress with a deficit.22 For the
Nixon years, table 6 in the report demonstrated that the net effect of congressional
action on the deficit was near zero.23 From fiscal years 1969 through 1973,
Congress reduced Nixon’s appropriation requests by $30.9 billion.24 During that
same period, it increased spending authority on legislative bills (backdoor spending
and mandatory programs) by $30.5 billion.25 As for actual outlays, Table 6

14. The Presidents News Conference of January 31, 1973, PUB. PAPERS 62 (Jan. 31, 1973).
15. Id.
16. FISHER, supra note 9, at 169, 176.
17. H.R. REP. NO. 93-147, at 1 (1973).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 7. Detailed statistics from the committee report appear in Louis Fisher, Congress, the
Executive and the Budget, 411 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 102, 105 (1974).
23. H.R. REP. NO. 93-147, at 39.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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indicated that Congress added $6.8 billion to the deficit over the five-year period.26
However, the total deficit over that period exceeded $100 billion.27 The problem
was not solely legislative action. High deficits were regularly incorporated in
budgets that Presidents submitted to Congress.28
III. THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT
What was missing during the Nixon years was a responsible presidential
budget required by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, providing guidance on
the size of the federal debt.29 At the end of the nineteenth century, federal spending
rose sharply because of pension bills, rivers and harbors projects, the SpanishAmerican War, and construction of the Panama Canal.30 After twenty-eight
uninterrupted years of budget surpluses, stretching from 1866 to 1903, the nation
encountered deficits for the next six years.31 Congress initiated a number of
inquiries into the work method of the executive departments. Those investigations
included the Cockrell Committee (1887-1889) and the Cockrell-Dockery
Commission (1893-1895).32
A decline in customs revenue in 1904, combined with a sharp rise in federal
outlays for a $50 million right-of-way for the Panama Canal, created a substantial
deficit for the Theodore Roosevelt administration.33 In response, President
Roosevelt appointed the Keep Commission in 1905 to determine how the
Executive Branch might conduct its operations on the “most economical and
effective basis in the light of the best modern business practices.”34 He emphasized
the need to eliminate duplication of work, wasteful habits, superfluous letter
writing, and inordinate attention to paperwork.35
In 1910, President William Howard Taft obtained $100,000 from Congress to
create a five-member Commission on Economy and Efficiency.36 In June 1912, he
submitted proposals for a national budget, making the President responsible for
reviewing agency estimates and organizing them into a coherent document.37 The
Commission concluded that a national budget was the “only effective means
whereby the Executive may be made responsible for getting before the country a
definite, well-considered, comprehensive program with respect to which the
legislature must assume responsibility either for action or inaction.”38
The financial shock of World War I precipitated action on budget reform. The
War pushed federal expenditures to record heights—from about $700 million

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
LOUIS FISHER, THE LAW OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 234-37 (2014).
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 234.
FISHER, supra note 9, at 27.
Id. at 27-28
Id. at 28.
Id., 275 n.48.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL BUDGET, H.R. DOC. NO. 854 at 138 (1912) (emphasis added).

2015]

PRESIDENTIAL FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY

291

before the War to upwards of $12.7 billion and $18.5 billion by 1918 and 1919.39
The total national debt, slightly over one-billion in 1916, soared beyond $25 billion
by 1919.40 Debt management problems after the War demanded modernization of
the budget process and an increased financial responsibility for the Executive
Branch.41
Several reform proposals would have placed Congress in a subordinate
position. John J. Fitzgerald, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee,
met with the New York Constitutional Convention in 1915 to share thoughts on
national budgeting.42 He supported a process that would make it as difficult as
possible for members of Congress to increase estimates submitted by the
President.43 It was his position that Congress should be denied the right to
appropriate any funds “unless it had been requested by the head of the department,
unless by a two-thirds vote, or unless it was to pay a claim against the government
or for its own expenses.”44
Charles Wallace Collins, in an article published in 1916, endorsed the British
parliamentary system.45 “Our institutions,” he claimed, “being more nearly akin to
those of England, it is to the English budget system that we more naturally look for
the purpose of illustration.”46 According to his understanding, the British
Parliament had long ago looked to the Cabinet to initiate financial legislation and
generally ratified what was recommended by executive officials. To Collins, an
essential system of budget reform in the United States was “the relinquishing of the
initiative in financial legislation to the executive by the Congress.”47 The President
would “possess the functions of a Prime Minister in relation to public finance” by
taking responsibility for preparing the budget.48 Congress would surrender its
power to amend presidential recommendations “by way of increasing any item in
the budget, and also its power to introduce any bill making a charge upon the
Treasury, without the consent of the executive.”49
Some of those proposals were adopted by members of Congress. In March
1918, Rep. Medill McCormick introduced legislation to unify the review of agency
estimates by the Secretary of the Treasury. A House Budget Committee would
replace the Committees on Appropriations and Ways and Means, with the same
centralization occurring in the Senate. These budget committees, with jurisdiction
over both appropriations and revenue, would be empowered to reduce but not add,
unless requested by the Secretary of the Treasury acting on the President’s
authority, or unless the committees could muster a two-thirds majority. Members
39. FISHER, supra note 9, at 32.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. FISHER, supra note 29, at 235.
43. Id.
44. John J. Fitzgerald, American Financial Methods from the Legislative Point of View, 62 MUN.
RES. 299, 312, 322, 327, 340 (1915).
45. Charles Wallace Collins, Constitutional Aspects of a National Budget System, 25 YALE L.J. 376,
376 (1916).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 380.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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of Congress would not be allowed to add to the budget on the floor except to
restore what the President had originally proposed.50
William McAdoo, President Woodrow Wilson’s first Secretary of the
Treasury, supported these restrictions on Congress: “Let us be honest with
ourselves and honest with the American people. A budget which does not cover
the initiation or increase of appropriations by Congress will be a semblance of the
real thing.”51 When Secretary of the Treasury Carter Glass submitted budget
estimates in 1919, he announced that the budget “as thus prepared for the President
and on his responsibility should not, as such, be increased by the Congress.”52
David Houston, the next Secretary of the Treasury, urged Congress in 1920 not to
add to the President’s budget unless recommended by the Secretary of the Treasury
or approved by a two-thirds majority.53
Critics of this presidential-centric model regarded it as a diminution of the
legislative power of the purse and a threat to republican government. “Uncle Joe”
Cannon, Speaker of the House from 1903 to 1911, insisted that if Congress agreed
to an executive budget “it will have surrendered the most important part of a
representative government.”54 He advised: “I think we had better stick pretty close
to the Constitution with its division of powers well defined and the taxing power
close to the people.”55 Edward Fitzgerald, author of a budget study in 1918,
regarded the British budget model as a step toward autocracy and a Prussian-style
military state.56
In June 1919, the House passed a resolution to create a Select Committee on
the Budget. Its report criticized the lack of internal executive checks in reviewing
and correcting departmental estimates: “The estimates are a patchwork and not a
structure. As a result, a great deal of the time of the committees of Congress is
taken up in exploding the visionary schemes of bureau chiefs for which no
administration would be willing to stand responsible.”57 To the Committee, the
goals of economy and efficiency could be achieved only by making an officer
responsible for receiving and scrutinizing requests for funds by bureau and
departmental chiefs: “In the National Government there can be no question but that
the officer upon whom should be placed this responsibility is the President of the
United States.”58 A newly created Bureau of the Budget would provide technical
assistance to the President.
The bill that passed the House on October 21, 1919, did not provide for an
executive budget patterned after the British model. It was executive only in the
sense that the President was made responsible for forwarding agency estimates. It
was legislative thereafter, giving Congress full authority to increase or decrease the
50. MEDDILL MCCORMICK, PLAN FOR A NATIONAL BUDGET SYSTEM, H.R. DOC. NO. 1006 (1918).
51. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1918-19, at 121 (Oct. 4, 1919) (testimony of
Secretary Glass).
52. Id. at 117.
53. DAVID F. HOUSTON, EIGHT YEARS WITH WILSON’S CABINET 88 (1926).
54. THE NATIONAL BUDGET, H.R. DOC. NO. 264 at 28 (1919).
55. Id. at 28-29.
56. EDWARD FITZPATRICK, BUDGET MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY viii-ix, (1918); see also
FITZPATRICK, supra, at 117.
57. NATIONAL BUDGET SYSTEM, H.R. REP. NO. 362 at 4 (1919).
58. Id. at 5.
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estimates. Changes could be made in committee or on the floor by simple majority
vote, not the two-thirds margin that many reformers had proposed, and certainly
not by requiring Congress to seek permission from the President and the Secretary
of the Treasury. The report from the House Select Committee on the Budget set
forth the constitutional principles in clear terms: “The budget under this plan will
be an Executive budget only to the extent that the Executive initiates the budget. It
is a congressional budget after it has been considered and acted upon by Congress.
The responsibility of the Executive and Congress will be clearly defined, and each
branch will be held to a strict accountability for the part it has played.”59 This
legislation was eventually signed by President Warren Harding in 1921.60 This
budget system worked relatively well until the confrontation between President
Nixon and Congress over impoundment.
IV. STATUTORY LIMITS ON IMPOUNDMENT
The severity of Nixon’s impoundments prompted about eighty lawsuits, with
the administration losing most of them.61
The administration justified
impoundment under the legal theory that Congress had merely authorized programs
without mandating them. Federal courts regularly found the administration’s
position unpersuasive, declaring the actions of executive officials to be in excess of
their authority, in violation of agency regulations, and conducted in a manner that
was arbitrary and capricious.62 One case found that the Secretary of Agriculture
lacked statutory authority to terminate a direct loan program while using those
funds for a different program favored by the administration.63 In another case, a
district court ruled the Secretary of the Housing and Urban Development
Department was obliged by law to administer a water and sewer grant program and
lacked authority to entirely suspend it, which was an “abuse of discretion.”64
The impoundment case that reached the Supreme Court involved funds for the
clean-water program.65 Congress had provided $18 billion in contract authority
over a three-year period to provide for waste treatment.66 The statute provided for
some administrative flexibility. For each year, the dollar amounts were described
as “not to exceed.”67 They were thus ceilings rather than mandatory levels for
obligation and expenditure.68 Instead of using this flexibility to implement the

59. Id. at 7.
60. Budget and Accounting Act, Pub. L. No. 67-13 Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921).
61. FISHER, supra note 9, at 175-201.
62. Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143, 157 (D. Minn. 1973).
63. Sioux Valley Empire Elec. Assoc. v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 686 (D. S.D. 1973).
64. Rooney v. Lynn, Civil Action No. 201-73 (D.D.C. 1974) [Editor’s note: Rooney v. Lynn does
not appear to have been reported, and no copy of the decision has been located. The author, however,
discusses this case in some detail in FISHER, supra note 9, at 193]; see also Nile Stanton, History and
Practice of Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds, 53 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1974); Louis Fisher,
Impoundment of Funds: Uses and Abuses, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 141 (1973); Nile Stanton, The Presidency
and the Purse: Impoundment 1803-1973, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 25 (1973).
65. FISHER, supra note 9, at 184-89.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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program within a scheduled period of time, Nixon cut it in half.69
At hearings in 1973, Senator Muskie confronted William D. Ruckelshaus,
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.70 Muskie argued that the
purpose of Congress in providing the agency discretion and flexibility was to see
that the statutory commitment be carried out in full, not to undermine the
legislative purpose:
The clear language and debate was what we were giving you, is what we
understood to be legitimate administrative discretion to spend the money, not
defeat the purposes. Then to have you twist it as you have, is a temptation of this
71
Senator to really handcuff you the next time.

On February 18, 1975, the Supreme Court ruled that the Clean Water Act
required full allotment.72 A unanimous Court decided that the addition of phrases
such as “not to exceed” did not alter the basic thrust of the statute, which was
intended to provide a firm commitment of substantial sums within a fixed period of
time.73
Executive officials told Congress that President Nixon was simply following
precedents that dated back to President Thomas Jefferson, who withheld $50,000
OMB Director, Caspar
that Congress provided in 1803 for gunboats.74
Weinberger, told a Senate committee: “[W]e are doing not only nothing different
than any other President since Thomas Jefferson has done; we are doing it to no
greater degree.”75 In response to this testimony by the Nixon administration, I
published an article for the Washington Star on February 25, 1973, entitled
“Impoundment Relies on Weak Arguments.”76 In that article, I examined the legal
and political claims offered by the administration and found none of them
persuasive or credible. Jefferson’s actions had zero application to Nixon’s
impoundments. The military emergency that Congress had anticipated in 1803
disappeared because of the Louisiana Purchase. Jefferson took time to study the
most recent models of gunboats and a year later spent the money. His action was
temporary and had the support and understanding of Congress. He did not
unilaterally terminate programs, impose a spending ceiling, berate Congress for
fiscal irresponsibility, or attempt to dictate budget priorities over those chosen by
Congress.
69. Id.
70. Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President, supra note 5, at 411.
71. Id.
72. Train v. City of N.Y., 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975).
73. Id.
74. FISHER, supra note 9, at 150-51.
75. Caspar W. Weinberger to Be Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare (Part 1), 93d Cong. 29 (1973). HUD Secretary George
Romney also cited the Jefferson precedent to defend Nixon’s impoundments. Dep’t of Housing and
Urban Development; Space, Science, Veterans, and Certain Other Independent Agencies
Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1973: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong.
565 (1972).
76. Louis Fisher, Impoundment Relies on Weak Arguments, WASH. SUN. STAR AND DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 25, 1973, at C2, reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 5801-03, 7087-88 (1973). For further details on
Jefferson’s temporary withholding of funds for gunboats, see the analysis by Joseph Cooper at 119
CONG. REC. 7065 (1973).
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Each chamber of Congress drafted legislation to control presidential
impoundment. The general idea was to divide impoundments into two categories:
“rescissions” (actions to terminate funds) and “deferrals” (proposals to delay
spending).77 Lawmakers agreed to prohibit Presidents from canceling a program
unless Congress specifically approved by statute.78 The President would have to
submit a rescission proposal to Congress and have it approved within a designated
period of days.79 Congress could ignore the request if it so chose.80 Legislative
inaction meant that the funds would have to be spent.81
For deferrals, lawmakers agreed that Congress could disapprove by something
short of a public law and they chose a one-house veto.82 The Supreme Court’s
1983 decision in INS v. Chadha, striking down the legislative veto, invalidated the
one-house veto over deferrals.83 Several years later, the D.C. Circuit determined
that the one-house veto was tied inextricably to the deferral authority.84 If one fell,
so did the other. The President’s authority to make policy deferrals thus
disappeared. Only routine, non-policy deferrals are permitted. Congress promptly
converted the judicial ruling into statutory policy.85
Toward the end of the effort to pass a bill checking presidential
impoundments, Senator Ervin asked me if I thought the legislation protected
congressional interests. I told him it did. We did not talk about the other titles of
the bill that changed the budget process within Congress. Supporters of this reform
believed that if the executive budget of 1921 strengthened presidential control, a
legislative budget would strengthen Congress.86 But why assume that centralizing
the budget process within the legislative branch would yield comparable benefits?
V. CENTRALIZING THE LEGISLATIVE BUDGET PROCESS
The Impoundment Control Act appeared in Title X of the Budget Act of
1974.87 Although I worked on other titles of the statute, I had serious doubts about
the need to radically revamp congressional procedures. Congress created budget
committees in each house and directed them to draft budget resolutions to set totals
for aggregates: total spending, total revenues, and the resulting deficit or surplus.88
The budget resolution divided spending into broad functional categories such as
national defense, agriculture, transportation, and other sectors.89 The objective was
77. FISHER, supra note 29, at 241.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88
Stat. 297, 334-35 (1974).
83. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
84. New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
85. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100119, § 206, 101 Stat. 754, 785, (1987).
86. FISHER, supra note 29, at 242.
87. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88
Stat. 297, 332 (1974).
88. Id. at 299-302.
89. Id. at 306-16.
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to facilitate debate on budget priorities. The statute established a new
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to provide analytical support to lawmakers,
making them less dependent on the Executive Branch.90 This agency has served
Congress well in estimating program costs and providing budgetary projections.91
Over the years, CBO has earned a solid reputation by providing nonpartisan,
professional assistance.92 In so doing, it has helped to protect the system of checks
and balances and safeguard an independent Legislative Branch.93
The 1974 statute assumed that lawmakers would behave more responsibly if
they voted on budget aggregates, facing up to totals rather than voting in
“piecemeal” fashion on separate authorization, appropriation, and revenue bills.
However, one result of the statute was to weaken the central purpose of the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921: to place a personal and non-delegable duty on the
President to prepare a responsible budget, particular with regard to such aggregate
as the budget deficit.94 What the 1974 statute did was to generate multiple budgets:
one submitted by the President, the House budget resolution, the Senate budget
resolution, and the final resolution agreed to by both chambers.95 From 1921 to
1974, the President’s budget provided a fixed and visible benchmark, making it
easy for the public to know if legislative action was below or above the President’s
estimates.96 That reference point disappeared in 1974. Instead of keeping within
the President’s aggregates, lawmakers could vote on general ceilings in budget
resolutions and tell their constituents they had “stayed within the budget,” even if
their actions exceeded the President’s budget.97
Accountability of elected officials, instead of being strengthened, declined.
President Reagan, finding many political benefits to the Budget Act of 1974, was
quite willing to step aside and let Congress “make the budget.”98 In 1985, he
announced his acceptance of appropriations bills “even if above my budget, that
were within the limits set by Congress’s own budget resolution.”99 If Presidents
ducked their duty under the 1921 statute to present a responsible budget and
submitted one with high deficits, it was evident to me that Congress found itself
institutionally incapable of converting an irresponsible presidential budget to a
responsible one. To do so would require drastic cuts in spending and sharp
increases in taxes, a political step I found that was highly unlikely and unrealistic.
The 1974 statute also weakened the Appropriations Committees. In my
judgment, previously they had functioned as guardian of the purse, regularly
keeping appropriations under the President’s requests. Under the new budget
90. Id. at 302-05.
91. See generally PHILIP G. JOYCE, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: HONEST NUMBERS,
POWER, AND POLICYMAKING (2011).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. FISHER, supra note 29, at 242.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Treasury
Department, Postal Service, and Certain Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1401 (Nov. 15, 1985).
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procedure, they found it difficult to resist amendments for greater spending. If
their draft bill fell short of the amount allocated to them in a budget resolution, the
Appropriations Committees were under pressure to spend “up to” the figure in the
budget resolution.100 A chief clerk in an appropriations committee objected that
spending limits in a budget resolution had been set at far too generous a level,
forcing the committee to “spend up to the full budget allocation.”101
From my personal involvement in the legislative process, I noticed that budget
reformers in the 1971-1974 period believed that centralization of Congress was
better than decentralization, comprehensive action superior to fragmentation, and
large legislative vehicles (budget resolutions) more likely to result in responsible
action than smaller vehicles. After seeing the damage done by the 1974 procedure,
former CBO Director, Rudolph Penner, offered insightful analysis during a House
hearing in 1990.102 He concluded that Congress operating under its former
decentralized and informal system had been more coherent and responsible, and
that both elected branches performed reasonably well under the older and now
discredited legislative process.103 He now remarked:
I have always been struck by the fact in looking at the history of the [budget]
process that it appeared chaotic in the late 19th century and early 20th century, but
the results were very good in terms of budget discipline, yielding balanced budgets
and surpluses most of the time, unless there was really a good reason to run a
104
deficit.

Although the 1974 statute created a process that “looks very elegant on paper”
it had led to very dishonest and disorderly results.105 He noted that those who
criticized the Budget Act as “too complex and too time consuming, are right on the
mark.”106
In following the budgetary process, the record was clear to me that that when
Presidents submit a responsible budget with regard to aggregates (as required by
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921), Congress will live within those
aggregates while changing the priorities, which it has every constitutional right to
do. That process worked well before and can work again. If a President submits an
irresponsible budget on such aggregates as the deficit, which has been the pattern
from Nixon to the present time, lawmakers cannot correct it, regardless of what
process they follow. To do so would require them to rely on a combination of
raising taxes and cutting programs deeply, a prospect that is highly unlikely for
political reasons. That point was evident during the Reagan presidency and has
been underscored ever since.

100. FISHER, supra note 29, at 243.
101. 125 CONG. REC. 9028 (1979).
102. Budget Process Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 101st Cong. 20 (1990)
(statement of Rudolph Penner, Former Director, Cong. Budget Office).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 21.
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VI. REAGAN AND THE GRAMM-RUDMAN ACTS
When President Ronald Reagan entered office, the national debt stood at one
trillion dollars, reflecting from 1789 to 1981 a succession of economic crises, wars,
and the Great Depression.107 During the eight years of his administration the
national debt tripled.108 It now exceeds $18 trillion with the prospect of much
higher levels over the coming decade.109 The confidence of other nations in the
capacity of the United States to manage its finances has declined. The principal
issue is not whether the current budget process has serious failings. Demonstrably,
it does. The more basic issue is how reform proposals can affect our constitutional
system of government by weakening Congress, the system of representative
government, separation of powers, checks and balances, and public trust in
government.
Supporters of the Budget Act of 1974 believed that if the executive budget of
1921 strengthened presidential control, a legislative budget would strengthen
Congress.110 The analogy need not hold. The two branches have different
institutional qualities and capabilities. The President heads the executive branch
and gains strength from a central budget office. There is no head in Congress and
no possibility of a central budget office comparable to OMB. Executive agencies
are subordinate to the control of the President and OMB. No such control could be
exercised by CBO.
Compared to the Executive Branch, Congress is by nature decentralized. It is
split between two chambers with rival political parties vying for control. The
Executive Branch has two elected officials: the President and Vice President.
Congress has 535, each with an independent political base. The Legislative Branch
is driven by committees and subcommittees that operate with a certain level of
autonomy. The Executive Branch is largely hierarchical. Congress is essentially
collegial in its operations.
Most budget reformers in 1974, assuming that centralization is better than
decentralization, believed that centralizing forces within Congress would
strengthen the legislative branch and weaken the President. The opposite result
occurred in 1981 when President Reagan gained control of the budget resolution by
attracting votes from Republicans and conservative Democrats.111 He used the
budget resolution as a blueprint to cut taxes, increase defense spending, and reduce
some domestic programs.112 By seizing control of the budget resolution and the
reconciliation process, he was able to largely control appropriations bills and the
tax bill.113 The budget resolution advanced presidential, not congressional,
objectives.114 Instead of the annual deficits of $25 billion that plagued the Nixon

107. FISHER, supra note 29, at 244.
108. Id.
109. Jonathan Weisman, Budget Forecast Sees End to Sharp Deficit Declines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2015, at A13.
110. FISHER, supra note 29, at 243.
111. Id. at 244.
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years, deficits exploded to $200-250 billion a year under Reagan.115
It is highly unlikely that the costly political and economic miscalculations of
1981 could have occurred without budget resolutions and the reconciliation
process.116 President Reagan would have faced almost insurmountable hurdles had
to tried to push his economic program through a decentralized Congress, with
committees and subcommittees able to check and reshape White House
objectives.117 Incremental legislative actions (or inactions) by a series of legislative
actors would have presented an effective brake on presidential ambitions.118
The whole purpose of the 1974 statute was to force Congress to vote on an
overall budget plan. If the White House gained control of that plan, the process
would serve presidential ends.
David Stockman, who headed OMB from 1981 to 1985, explained how the
Reagan Administration exploited the centralized congressional process.119 The
constitutional prerogatives of Congress “would have to be, in effect, suspended.120
Enacting the Reagan Administration’s economic program meant rubber stamp
approval, nothing less.121 The world’s so-called greatest deliberative body would
have to be reduced to the status of a ministerial arm of the White House.”122
Members of Congress, far more expert in budget matters than Stockman, regularly
deferred to his leadership, assertions, and analysis. After leaving office, Stockman
admitted his lack of understanding: “[A] plan for radical and abrupt change
required deep comprehension—and we had none of it.”123
In this climate of uncontrolled deficits, the two branches decided to make
things worse by passing the misnamed Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985, commonly called the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH)
statute.124 Designed to control deficits, it failed utterly in that regard. What GRH
did was to announce, very plainly, that the 1974 budget process could not be
counted on to handle budget aggregates and deficits—precisely the capacity that
budget reformers had touted. Gramm-Rudman established a statutory schedule to
eliminate deficits by fiscal 1991.125 Beginning with a deficit of $171.9 billion for
fiscal 1986, the deficit was scheduled to decline by $36 billion a year over five
years until it reached zero.126 The President with his budget and Congress with its
budget resolutions were obligated to follow these statutory mandates. If in any
fiscal year the projected deficit exceeded the statutory allowance by more than $10
115. Id.
116. Rudolph G. Penner, An Appraisal of the Congressional Budget Process, in CRISIS IN THE
BUDGET PROCESS 69 (1986); Allen Schick, How the Budget Was Won and Lost, in PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS: ASSESSING REAGAN’S FIRST YEAR 25 (Norman J. Ornstein ed., 1982).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS: HOW THE REAGAN REVOLUTION FAILED
159 (1986).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 91.
124. FISHER, supra note 29, at 244-45.
125. Id. at 245.
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billion, another mechanical solution kicked in.127 A “sequestration” process
required across-the-board cuts to protect the statutory targets. Half of the
reductions would come from national defense.128 Designated social programs were
exempt from these automatic cuts.129
Draft legislation relied on two congressional offices (CBO and GAO) to carry
out what seemed clearly executive duties. One bill required the CBO and OMB
Directors to estimate the levels of total revenues and budget outlays to determine
whether the deficit for a particular year would exceed the statutory limit.130 The
two agencies would then specify the degree to which agency budgets had to be cut
to eliminate the excess deficit.131 Upon receiving the CBO-OMB report, the bill
required the President to issue an order to eliminate the excess deficit.132 Over that
decision the President could exercise no independent judgment or discretion. It
was his duty to sign his name to the sequestration order prepared by CBO and
OMB.133
The Senate held no hearings to consider the constitutionality of this legislation.
The House Committee on Government held a hearing on October 17, 1985. Invited
to testify were Comptroller General Charles Bowsher, OMB Director Jim Miller,
and CBO Director, Rudolph Penner. In their testimony they did not analyze or
comment on constitutional issues. I was the fourth to testify, and proceeded to give
my opinion that the bill was unconstitutional because it gave CBO and GAO
“substantive enforcement responsibilities.”134 My testimony relied in part on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo,135 which prohibited Congress from
vesting substantive and enforcement responsibilities in legislative officers.
The bill that emerged from conference committee authorized the Comptroller
General to certify the results reached by CBO and OMB. In the opinion of Senator
Bob Packwood, the addition of GAO, “which indeed is an executive agency . . .
cures the allegation of unconstitutionality.”136 However, GAO is not an executive
agency. It functions as a research and investigative arm of Congress. Instead of
resolving the constitutional issue, Congress chose to push it to the judiciary. It
authorized any member of Congress to take the issue to court, following an
expedited process that would begin with a three-judge court and go from there
directly to the Supreme Court.137
The three-judge court held that the transfer of executive powers to the
Comptroller General was unconstitutional, and its finding was affirmed by the

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985: Hearing on H.J. Res. 372
Before the H. Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong. 25-26 (1985).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 200, 198-200, 207-12.
135. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
136. 131 CONG. REC. 30273, 30274 (1985).
137. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 274, 99
Stat. 1098 (1985).
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Supreme Court.138 Recognizing that the legislation was at constitutional risk,
Congress provided for a “fallback” procedure in case the courts struck down the
statute.139 Under the substitute process, the OMB and CBO reports would go to a
specially created Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction consisting of
the full membership of both Budget Committees.140 This joint committee would
then report the sequestration bill for floor action. If passed by both chambers, it
would go to the President to be signed or vetoed.141
Gramm-Rudman was ineffective in controlling exploding budget deficits
during the Reagan years. Both branches relied on dishonest budget projections and
new heights of accounting ingenuity to project compliance with the scheduled
annual deficit reductions.142 Costs were shifted to the next year or even to the
previous one.143 Some items were moved off budget. Improbable estimates of
revenues were devised to satisfy the deficit targets, even if no one expected the
revenues to materialize.144 Rep. Marty Russo, member of the House Budget
Committee, explained how the two branches practiced deceit:
The President submits a budget that relies on very optimistic economic and
technical assumptions and questionable savings proposals to meet the GrammRudman deficit target. Congress attacks the assumptions and proposals as phony,
145
but uses them in the budget resolution anyway.

Congress adopted the President’s numbers because honest figures (which were
available) would have increased the projected deficit and made Congress look like
the “big spender.”146 Once the President chose to submit a deceptive budget,
lawmakers were compelled by politics to embrace the same mistaken and
misleading figures. Budget analyst Allen Schick summarized the result: “GRH
started out as a process for reducing the deficit and has become a means of hiding
the deficit and running away from responsibility.”147
Gramm-Rudman never came close to meeting any of its prescribed deficit
targets. When it became obvious that the experiment had failed, and why,
Congress nevertheless enacted a revision in 1986 known as GRH II.148 It projected
a deficit of zero by fiscal 1993. The actual deficit for that year: $255 billion.149
From Reagan forward, Presidents and Congresses continued to sidestep
accountability for federal deficits. The national debt climbed from $1 trillion to $3

138. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1391-93 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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trillion during the Reagan’s presidency.150 President George H. W. Bush, after
initially pledging no new taxes, abandoned that principle during the summer of
1990.151 Several budget initiatives, including the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990,
seemed to indicate better control mechanisms than GRH.152 Still, the national debt
climbed to $4 trillion after four years of the Bush administration.153
As Allen Schick has explained, when President Bill Clinton took office he “put
deficit reduction at the top of his agenda, giving it priority over health care
reform.”154 In August 1993, he signed a package of tax increases and spending
cuts, helping to reduce the size of the deficit from 1993 to 1995.155 In what Schick
calls a political triumph, the budget was balanced in 1998.156 Because of a
favorable economy, annual surpluses emerged and appeared ready to persist after
Clinton left office.157 The political settlement during the Clinton years—with
spending constraints and tax increases—gave promise to controlling deficits and
even projected large surpluses.158
VII. A PRESIDENTIAL ITEM VETO
After both chambers of Congress agreed to pass legislation to curb the
impoundment actions of President Nixon, mounting national debts during the
Reagan and Bush I years, coupled with the failure of the Gramm-Rudman statutes,
prompted lawmakers to reconsider presidential power.159 Proposals were now
made to do precisely what the Impoundment Control Act prohibited: permit the
President to single out particular programs for termination.160 Beginning in 1987,
private citizens and some members of Congress argued that the President had an
“inherent item veto” and could refuse to spend money on particular programs.161
According to their belief, the power originated in 1789 and no one happened to
discover it until 1987.162 Close analysis by the Office of Legal Counsel in 1988
found not the slightest support for an inherent item veto.163 In 1992, President
George H. W. Bush announced that he did not possess such authority,164 but
advocates of this idea continued to promote it.165 A Senate hearing on June 15,
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1994, evaluated a Senate resolution to express the sense of the Senate that the
President currently has constitutional authority to veto individual items of
appropriations and the President should exercise that power without waiting for any
statutory authority.166 The Senate took no action on the resolution.167
Advocates of an inherent item veto argued that it was permissible because
Congress had resorted to “omnibus” legislation (measures much larger than the
standard appropriations bills) and thus undercut the President’s original veto
power.168 Acting in self-defense, the President could “unbunch” those bills by
vetoing line items and riders.169 However, omnibus legislation is not a modern
invention. In 1789, Congress passed an appropriations bill that consisted of four
lump-sum amounts for the entire government.170 The bill covered twenty-three
lines in the U.S. statutes.171 A similar omnibus appropriations bill appeared the next
year.172 President George Washington never objected to receiving omnibus bills.
Writing in 1793, he offered this view of the veto power: “From the nature of the
Constitution, I must approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.”173 There
was nothing new about appropriation riders. At the Philadelphia Convention, the
delegates debated the procedure for passing tax bills in the House and allowing
amendment in the Senate. George Mason expressed concern that Senators might
follow “the practice of tacking foreign matters to money bills.”174
Lawmakers during the 1990s explored ways to grant the President some form
of expanded impoundment power, allowing a rescission (termination) power
greater than that provided in the Impoundment Control Act.175 Most of the focus
was on two ways a President could rescind funds. “Expedited rescission” required
at least one chamber of Congress to support a President’s recommendation to
cancel funds and rescind items.176 “Enhanced rescission” would grant the President
much greater power.177 Under this procedure, the President’s recommendations
would automatically become law unless Congress passed a resolution of
disapproval.178 If it did, and the President vetoed the resolution, Congress would
need a two-thirds majority in each chamber to override the veto.179 Throughout
this period, I was active in testifying against the item veto and preparing budget
analyses to demonstrate that estimates of savings expected by a presidential item
veto were greatly exaggerated.180
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Also considered was a version of item-veto authority called “separate
enrollment.”181 That procedure would convert 13 appropriation bills into about
10,000 bills.182 After an appropriation bill passed both chambers, a clerk would
break it into separate paragraphs, sections, and numbers, with each piece made into
a bill and submitted to the President.183 The Senate passed that version.184
Republicans delayed taking an item veto bill to conference because they did not
want to give President Clinton access to that authority in the middle of 1996, an
election year.185 The Item Veto Act of 1996, signed by Clinton, adopted the model
of enhanced rescission.186 Although it was enacted on April 9, the bill did not take
effect until January 1; a delay intended to deny Clinton use of an item veto with
whatever political benefit that would give him.
To the surprise of many Republicans, Clinton was reelected and made some
use of the item veto.187 As a remedy for budget deficits, the item veto fell far short
of expectations. Over a five-year period, total savings came to less than $600
million.188 The anticipated use of the item veto to cut spending to balance the
budget had been greatly oversold.189
In 1997, a district court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it
violated the legislative procedures set forth in Article I.190 On appeal, the Supreme
Court ruled that the plaintiffs (members of Congress) lacked standing to bring the
case.191 The following year, a district court in a separate lawsuit found standing for
private plaintiffs and held the statute unconstitutional for failure to follow the
procedures of Article I.192 The Supreme Court affirmed.193 It took another branch
of government to provide the constitutional analysis that Congress should have
performed by itself.
VIII. FROM GEORGE W. BUSH TO BARACK OBAMA
There were efforts after 1998 to enact some other type of item-veto authority.
After the Supreme Court invalidated enhanced rescission, the likely alternative
focused on expedited rescission.194 In 2006, Congress debated legislation to give
the President that authority (S. 2381 and H.R. 4890).195 The Budget Committees in
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each house held hearings. Support for the President’s recommendations needed the
approval of both houses in a bill returned to the President for his signature. H.R.
4890 passed the House on June 22, 2006. The Senate did not act on that bill or its
own version.196
In 2009 and 2010, with deficits climbing because of tax cuts by President
George W. Bush, the deep recession, two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, entitlement
programs for individuals (including social security and Medicare), and the financial
bailout, Congress held hearings on expedited rescission.197 President Obama asked
for expedited rescission authority.198 The bills did not pass. On February 8, 2012,
the House passed legislation to provide expedited rescission for the President.199
The Senate took no action on the bill.
Budget surpluses from the Clinton years did not last very long. President
George W. Bush decided to cut taxes and fight two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
without paying for either of them. Those actions, combined with the economic
collapse in 2008, added trillions to the national debt. Given economic conditions in
2009, no one expected President Barack Obama to present a balanced budget, but it
was within his capacity to propose tax and spending changes that would bring
deficits under control ten years out. For various reasons that was not done, in part
because both branches chose to rely on a variety of mechanical procedures—
including a fiscal commission and a “supercommittee” in Congress—that would
automatically do what Presidents and lawmakers refused to do. Much like GrammRudman, these failed experiments promised budget control without doing anything
tangible to reduce deficits.
In 2009, members of Congress debated the idea of creating a fiscal
commission to confront massive federal deficits. Bills were introduced to empower
a commission to draft legislation to “reform tax policy and entitlement benefit
programs and ensure a sound fiscal future for the United States”—code words to
raise revenue, cut entitlements, and bring deficits under control.200 Legislative
sponsors believed this initiative would ensure broad bipartisan support and fiscal
success. Senator Kent Conrad, chairman of the Senate Budget Committee,
concluded, “the regular legislative process is simply not going to get it done.”201 In
taking that position, he conceded that the procedures of the Budget Act of 1974,
adopted for the express purpose of exercising effective control over budget
aggregates, were not reliable. Democrats and Republicans, acting alone or in
concert, would not agree to cut popular entitlement programs (Medicare, social
security, etc.) or raise taxes. As a means of guaranteeing that a proposal would
have strong bipartisan support, the fiscal commission would need a supermajority

196. Id. at 190.
197. Id.
198. See Jackie Calmes, Obama Asks for Authority to Cut Items for Spending, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2010, at A18; Walter Alarkon, President Asks Congress for More Power to Cut Spending, THE HILL,
May 25, 2010, at 3.
199. Rachael Bade, Bill Would Restore Line-Item Veto for Appropriations, CONG. Q. WKLY REP.,
Dec. 22, 2011, at 2674; 158 CONG. REC. H575, 593-615 (2012).
200. H.R. 1557, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1056, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 2853, 111th Cong. (2009).
201. Bipartisan Process Proposals for Long-Term Fiscal Stability, before S. Budget Comm. 1
(2009), at 1 (statement by Chairman Kent Conrad).

306

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

(for example, twelve out of sixteen members) before making its recommendations.
Hearings on this legislation in 2009 generally ignored a role for the President.
Instead, lawmakers and budget experts blamed Congress for the fiscal crisis: a
national debt of $12 trillion at the time and an annual deficit that exceeded $1.4
trillion. Projections estimated an addition $9 trillion added to the debt. Senator
George Voinovich, at a November 10 hearing, offered this perspective: “Congress
is simply not willing or not capable of enduring short term pain for long term
gain.”202 A fair observation, but why not say the same about Presidents George W.
Bush and Barack Obama? At one point in the hearing, Senator Lamar Alexander
did raise that point: “What about the President? The President has to be involved
. . . . He is the agenda setter . . . . No one else can come close to that.”203
In December 2009, the cover of Newsweek highlighted the budget crisis by
featuring this headline: “How Great Powers Fall: Steep Debt, Slow Growth, and
High Spending Kills Empires—And America Could be Next.” Which political
branch deserved blame? In the background was the Capitol, upside down.204
Where was the White House? It should have been upside down also. At a hearing
in December 2009, Senator Joe Lieberman explained that tackling the budget
deficit problem required “facing the hard choices Congress has shown in the past it
hasn’t the stomach for.”205 His evaluation of the legislative branch was justified,
but recent Presidents have demonstrated no stomach for the fight either. At that
same hearing, Senator Voinovich said that President Obama and his OMB Director
“realize we have a crisis that needs to be addressed.”206 If the crisis was that clear,
why did the President not address it squarely with recommendations? Why leave it
to Congress and a fiscal commission?
The basic idea of a Senate bill (S. 2853) was to create a fiscal commission
consisting of eighteen members to study methods of reducing the budget deficit.
Sixteen would be members of Congress; two would come from the executive
branch. The commission would be empowered to recommend changes in
entitlement programs, taxes, and appropriations. A majority of fourteen was
required to report the bill for floor action. No floor amendments would be allowed.
Lawmakers only choice was voting up or down, without making any changes. To
pass each chamber, a majority of sixty percent was needed. The bill failed in the
Senate, mustering a vote of only fifty-three to forty-six.207
At that point President Obama, instead of providing specific guidance to
control budget deficits over the next decade, issued an executive order on February
18, 2010, establishing an eighteen-member National Commission on Fiscal
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Responsibility and Reform.208 He had been in office for one year without
addressing the deficit issue, even for the out-years. Another year would be
consumed while waiting for the commission to present a plan no later than
December 1, 2010. To issue the report, the commission needed a supermajority of
fourteen of eighteen members.
Obama’s first budget message in February 2009 underscored the seriousness of
the budget deficit: “[W]e cannot lose sight of the long-run challenges that our
country faces and that threaten our economic health—specifically, the trillions of
dollars of debt that we inherited.”209 He explained that his initial budgets carried
high deficits because of the deep recession that began in 2008 and continued. Yet
he pledged: “we must begin the process of making the tough choices necessary to
restore fiscal discipline, cut the deficit in half by the end of my first term in office,
and put our Nation on sound fiscal footing.”210 Because his administration took
few concrete actions to achieve that goal, annual deficits continued to mount, to be
addressed in subsequent budgets.
In his budget message of February 2010, Obama told the nation: “we cannot
continue to borrow against our children’s future.”211 He spoke of the urgency of
“getting our fiscal house in order” and declared that “our fiscal situation remains
unacceptable.”212 Insufficient steps were taken by the administration to bring
future deficits under control, other than to wait for the fiscal commission to
complete its work. On July 13, 2010, Obama announced the appointment of his
new OMB Director, Jacob Lew, who would be responsible for reducing the deficit
“to 3 percent of the size of the economy by 2015.”213
Meanwhile, in December 2010, the fiscal commission completed its work but
could not attract the necessary fourteen votes to produce a deficit control plan.
President Obama said it was inaccurate to say the fiscal commission’s report would
be “shelved,” because it would “still provide a framework for a conversation.”214
Another year had elapsed without progress toward a balanced budget or even
projected surpluses. The New York Times pointed out in an editorial: “What Mr.
Obama’s budget is most definitely not is a blueprint for dealing with the real longterm problems that feed the budget deficit.”215 A Washington Post article carried
this title: Punter-in-chief: President Obama’s budget kicks the hard choices further
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down the road.216
Although the experiment with the fiscal commission had failed, Obama could
have adopted some of its proposals, such as making reductions in Social Security,
reductions in defense spending, and increased taxes.217 He made no such
recommendations.218 Nothing in his budget of February 2011 dealt substantively
with long-term deficits.219 OMB Director Lew spoke the language of budget
restraint, claiming that Obama’s budget is one “that lives within our means.”220
However, the February 2011 budget projected deficits of $7 trillion over the next
decade.221 The Congressional Budget Office projected deficits of $9.5 trillion over
the next decade.222
With President Obama unwilling to bring deficits—near-term or long-term—
under control, Congress passed the Budget Control Act on August 2, 2011, to
create a new process to reduce the deficit by up to $2.4 trillion over ten years. Part
of that reduction came from statutory caps for fiscal years 2012 through 2021,
amounting to an estimated $917 billion in savings. To enforce the caps, the statute
relied on the “sequesters” from Gramm-Rudman. If Congress were to exceed the
caps, automatic across-the-board spending cuts would occur within discretionary
accounts.223
The second step in deficit control depended on the work of a new twelvemember “supercommittee.”224 The statute directed the Joint Select Committee on
Deficit Reduction to recommend an additional $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction over
ten years.225 Interestingly, Congress once again decided it could not rely on its
regular legislative process or the procedures of the Budget Act of 1974 that had
promised control over aggregates, including deficits. Recommendations from this
new committee would be voted on by the end of 2011.226 If a majority of the
committee reached agreement on proposed legislative language, lawmakers had to
vote by December 23, 2011.227 No amendments were allowed.228 The bill needed
to be enacted by January 15, 2012, to avoid automatic spending cuts
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(“sequestration”).229 This threat was intended to force committee agreement. If it
did not achieve at least $1.2 trillion in deficit reduction, automatic sequesters would
be triggered to achieve the savings.230 As with Gramm-Rudman, various programs
were exempted from these cuts.231 Notwithstanding expectations about the
supercommittee, it failed to reach agreement.232
In February 2012, Obama’s budget included the $1 trillion in discretionary
spending required by the Budget Control Act of 2011.233 His budget proposed an
estimated $4 trillion in additional cuts by 2018.234 Even with those projections, the
estimated annual deficit for 2022 was $704 billion.235 If Congress declined to
accept some of his proposals for spending cuts and tax increases, projected deficits
would be higher.236 In mid-2013, CBO estimated deficits in 2023 to be a halftrillion dollars.237 A few months later, in a September 2013 report, CBO warned
that federal deficits might fall in the short term but long-term deficits will begin to
climb because of growing claims on entitlement programs such as Medicare,
Medicaid, and Social Security.238
A CBO study in June 2014 warned that the national debt would jump to 106
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2039, driven largely by the rising costs
of entitlement programs.239 Federal debt in 2014 represented seventy-four percent
of GDP.240 The upward path of the debt relative to the size of the economy marked
a trend “that could not be sustained indefinitely.”241 Although the annual federal
deficit declined to $468 billion for 2015 and was estimated to be $467 billion for
2016, the CBO projected that the deficit will begin to rise in 2017 and continue to
expand with an aging population receiving such benefits as Social Security and
health care.242
IX. CONCLUSION
If the budget process established in 1974 created dramatically less control over
spending and deficits, what can be done to recreate what worked better in the past?
A necessary first step: restore the essential importance of a responsible presidential

229. Id. § 251(a)(1).
230. Highlights of Budget Control Act, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPT., Aug. 8, 2011, at 1762
(“Enforcement trigger”).
231. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240; Highlights of Budget Control
Act, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPT., Aug. 8, 2011, at 1761-62.
232. FISHER, supra note 29, at 259-60.
233. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV’T 2-3 (2012).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Jackie Calmes, Military Cuts and Tax Plan Are Central To a Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2012, at A12.
237. Erik Wasson, CBO Says Deficit Shrinking at Faster Rate, THE HILL, May 15, 2013, at 13.
238. Jackie Calmes, Budget Office Warns That Deficits Will Rise Again Because Cuts Are
Misdirected, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at A16.
239. Bernie Becker, CBO says entitlement spending unsustainable, THE HILL, June 16, 2014, at 1.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Jonathan Weisman, Budget Forecast Sees End to Sharp Deficit Declines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2015, at A13.

310

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

budget. There must be pressure on the President—from Congress, scholars,
interest groups, the public, and the media—to assure that the process begins with
accountability by getting aggregates in order, particularly deficits. Executive
leadership is needed when submitting a responsible budget, not at some later point.
The record is clear that Congress can then live within those aggregates while
changing budget priorities as it likes. Both branches then draw on their
institutional strengths.
The constitutional process requires the President to play a central role in
submitting a responsible budget on aggregates. That is especially important in
controlling the deficit. That leadership function, eventually enacted into law with
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to cope with extraordinary deficits, was
gravely undermined by the 1974 statute. It unrealistically expected Congress to
make the budget, both in aggregate and in detail. We need a visible, credible, and
accountable presidential budget. The political focus must be initially on the
President, where it was before 1974 and where it needs to be now. With one
budget, the nation can fix a spotlight on the President and restore needed
accountability and personal responsibility. The budget system can work when the
President provides leadership by talking frankly to the nation and to Congress to
explain what steps are needed. The willingness of Bush I to support tax increases,
followed by Clinton’s decision to promote tax increases and spending constraints,
produced not only a balanced budget, but surpluses. We have not seen that level of
presidential involvement in the Bush II and Obama years.
Instead of presidential accountability and leadership, both branches have
resorted to a variety of ineffective substitutes, including budget resolutions, the
Gramm-Rudman Acts, item vetoes, fiscal commissions, and supercommittees.
Repeatedly, those alternatives to political action have failed. Presidents and
members of Congress are public servants, elected to handle problems that threaten
the nation’s fiscal health and stability. The picture that emerges from 1974 to the
present is a lack of the leadership skills in both elected branches needed to protect
republican and constitutional government.

